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As suggestions to modify the practice of the U.S. military justice system return to the fore 
of American political discourse, the perennial proposal to divest commanders of authority to 
convene courts-martial to adjudicate allegations of sexual assault is once again at the center of 
the debate. While reformists are adamant that the suggested revision would support efforts to end 
what has been characterized as an “epidemic of rape” in the U.S. military, the precise connection 
between the “reform” and the desired improved outcomes remains tenuous. An assessment of 
jurisdictions that have already divested commanders of such authority could provide persuasive 
support to the reformist assertion that the United States could expect improved performance – if 
the assessment reveals improved performance in other jurisdictions. 
This essay conducts a comparative quantitative analysis of four jurisdictions – Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada – to determine whether vesting court-martial convening 
authority in lawyers rather than commanders has resulted in improved performance in selected 
criteria in relation to the issue of sexual assault in the military. The comparative quantitative 
analysis conducted in this essay indicates that there is no correlative relationship between the 
“reform” and the improved performance reformists hope to achieve, at least in the context of the 
jurisdictions examined. This lack of a demonstrated correlative relationship in other jurisdictions 
creates reason to doubt whether divesting commanders of the authority to convene courts-martial 
to adjudicate allegations of sexual assault would lead to improved performance related to sexual 
assault in the U.S. military. 
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Measuring the Effectiveness of the Proposal to Divest Military Commanders of 
Disposition Authority for Sexual Assault Cases: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis 
 
Initial Observations 
As the Independent Review Commission (IRC) continues the assigned 90-day 
assessment of the issue of sexual assault in the U.S. military,1 the topic of military justice 
reform has returned to center stage in the American political landscape. Among the most 
contentious debates that has come to the fore yet again is whether military commanders 
should retain the authority to refer allegations of sexual assault to court-martial. Although 
this suggested reform is characterized by critics as a “solution in search of a problem,”2 by 
now this perennial high-profile target for avowed reformists has created a “dysfunctional 
cycle” that has been attributed to a “lack of basic knowledge about the military justice 
system.”3 
One centerpiece in the campaign for reform is to paint a damning picture of sexual 
assault in the military by crafting a convincing narrative that is founded on a statistical 
analysis. However, basing qualitative policy reforms, such as “improving” the problem of 
sexual assault in the military, primarily on statistical data carries a significant risk that the 
changes may not achieve the desired effect since numerical data is often not particularly 
revealing regarding the underlying causes of the particular quantitative conditions being 
measured. Nonetheless, the quantitative data that is available to the public has become a 
centerpiece of the widespread characterization of the dire state of the U.S. military justice 
system and the resulting need for drastic reform.  
As but one recent example, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand pointed out in a PBS 
interview, “Not only are there 20,000 estimated sexual assaults each year, but the percentage 
of cases that are going to trial is going down, and the percentage of cases ending in 
 
1 See Deputy Sec’y Def. Memorandum, Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military 
Structure and Membership (Mar. 23, 2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/mar/24/2002607579/-1/-
1/0/independent-review-commission-on-sexual-assault-in-the-military-structure-and-membership.pdf. 
2 Geoffrey S. Corn, Chris Jenks & Timothy C. MacDonnell, A Solution in Search of a Problem: The Dangerous 
Invalidity of Divesting Military Commanders of Disposition Authority for Military Criminal Offenses, JUST 
SECURITY (June 29, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71111/introducing-an-open-letter-from-former-u-s-military-
commanders-judge-advocates-commander-authority-to-administer-the-ucmj. 
3 Chris Jenks & Geoffrey S. Corn, The Military Justice “Improvement” Act of 2020, CAAFLOG 1 (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.caaflog.org/home/profs-jenks-corn-caaflog-exclusive-re-mjia. 
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conviction is also going down.”4 This quantitative narrative was cited to support Gillibrand’s 
assertion that the “epidemic of sexual assault” in the military “is getting much worse.” This 
characterization by Senator Gillibrand is strikingly similar to an assertion presented in the 
forum of public advocacy that the U.S. military is in the grips of an “epidemic of rape.”5 
Setting aside the efficacy of statistics-based narratives for the moment, the matter of 
whether the proposed reform would achieve the desired outcome is still a matter of debate. 
As Professor Lesley Wexler recently observed, an enhanced empirical or theoretical focus on 
jurisdictions that do not utilize a commander-centric model can help “make sure that the 
reforms proposed both address the existing problems and don’t exacerbate them 
unintentionally or create new ones altogether.”6 The chairperson of the IRC, Lynn 
Rosenthal, has maintained that the Commission is committed to considering “major shifts 
and big picture items” designed to “bring about evidence-based prevention and hold 
offenders accountable.”7 However, a detailed quantitative study of jurisdictions that have 
already divested commanders of the authority to refer sexual assault cases to trial should 
accompany any purported evidence-based suggestion for a “major shift” in policy in order to 
ensure that the “reform” is likely to have the desired effects. 
This essay assesses the performance of several U.S. partners and allies in relation to 
preventing and responding to sexual assault in the military. In doing so, the study is designed 
to contribute to the endeavor of developing an enhanced empirical and theoretical focus on 
jurisdictions that do not implement a commander-centric model of referring sexual assault 
cases to court-martial. The intent is to inform judgments regarding whether the proposed 
reform would actually be expected to address the existing problems and improve 
performance if implemented by the U.S. military. 
 
4 Sen. Gillibrand: Sexual Assault in Military an ‘Epidemic’ That’s Getting Worse, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 24, 2021), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/sen-gillibrand-sexual-assault-in-military-an-epidemic-thats-getting-worse. 
5 Press Release, Protect Our Defenders & Military Sexual Assault Survivors Announce Launch of 2020 Senate 
Candidate Pledge to Help End Crisis of Military Sexual Assault, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://www.protectourdefenders.com/press-release-protect-our-defenders-military-sexual-assault-survivors-
announce-launch-of-2020-senate-candidate-pledge-to-help-end-crisis-of-military-sexual-assault. 
6 Lesley Wexler, Military #MeToo Justice: Is a Change Going to Come?, VERDICT (Apr. 13, 2021), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2021/04/13/military-metoo-justice-is-a-change-going-to-come. 




While care must be taken to account for historical and cultural divergences when 
comparing legal frameworks across jurisdictions, analyzing the performance of jurisdictions 
that are similar in heritage to the United States but that do not permit commanders to refer 
sexual assault cases to trial can provide valuable insight regarding whether the proposed 
reform would achieve the desired effect. Because the U.S. military currently vests in 
commanders the authority to refer all criminal cases to court-martial, there is no data from 
which to draw to develop an assessment of the projected effectiveness of the suggested 
reform. In the absence of conclusive evidence at home to support or refute the effectiveness 
of the proposal, what lessons can be gleaned from abroad? 
 
Developing the Factors by Which to Measure “Success” 
 
To provide analytical structure to this question, this study draws on two salient 
observations on the topic that can be attributed to Senator Gillibrand. To establish the 
selection of jurisdictions to consult, a page on Gillibrand’s current website that is dedicated 
to the Military Justice Improvement Act notes that representatives from four other 
jurisdictions – Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada – provided evidence 
involving their own domestic military justice system to a Senate hearing in 2013.8 These four 
jurisdictions, then, are selected as the comparison set for the present inquiry. 
Next, to develop a desired endstate, this study returns to Gillibrand’s recent PBS 
interview for a particularly comprehensive articulation of what she hopes to achieve by 
pursuing this reform. During the interview, Senator Gillibrand asserted that if the “decision 
whether or not to go to trial in a given case [is] given to a trained military prosecutor who's 
outside of the chain of command of the victim and the accused”:9 
 
Then survivors would know that there was someone who would look at their case who 
has no skin in the game, who has no bias, who doesn't know them or the accused, who 
 
8 Kirsten Gillibrand, Military Justice Improvement Act: Comprehensive Resource Center for the Military Justice 
Improvement Act, https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia (last visited May 21, 2021). 
9 PBS NEWSHOUR, supra note 4. 
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will give them a fair shake. It will mean more survivors come forward. And it will also 
mean that, because of that professionalism, perhaps different cases are chosen and 
there's a better end result. 
 
Based on separate comments during the PBS interview, during which Senator Gillibrand 
asserts that “unfortunately, the problem is getting much worse” given that there are “20,000 
estimated sexual assaults each year,” it is reasonable to incorporate an expectation of reduced 
incidence of sexual assault in the military to the list of desired outcomes as well. 
With this vision in mind for what it would look like to, in Senator Gillibrand’s words 
during the interview, “fix this problem,” it would be reasonable to expect that the 
jurisdictions to which Gillibrand’s website refers – Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel and 
Canada – demonstrate acceptable performance in the categories of desired improved 
outcomes. This would support the conclusion that the United States could expect similar 
progress if it were to follow suit and “professionalize how the armed services handle[s]” 
sexual assault cases. That is, if “fixing” the problem means reduced incidence of reports of 
sexual assault, more victims coming forward, different cases being chosen, and a better end 
result for sexual assault cases (given remarks from earlier in the interview, presumably 
“better” in this context means higher conviction rates), observing these outcomes in the 
comparison set would constitute very strong evidence indeed in support of the proposal.  
Unfortunately for reformists, a comparative analysis reveals quite the opposite in 
relation to all of the categories of desired improved outcomes. In fact, an assessment of the 
current state of each of the four jurisdictions selected for the present inquiry demonstrates 
that there is no correlation at all – let alone indications of a causal relationship – between the 
proposed reform and improved outcomes involving sexual assault cases. The absence of at 
least a correlative relationship suggests that the proposed reform is unlikely to be effective in 
achieving the desired outcomes and that different measures may be called for. 
Although a full description of all potential comparative factors is beyond the scope of 
this study, an overview of the relevant aspects of the military justice structures of each of the 
four identified jurisdictions is sufficient for the present purpose of demonstrating the lack of 
5 
a correlative relationship between the proposed reform and the desired outcomes. After 
briefly introducing the military justice system in each jurisdiction, the analysis in the next 
section presents a snapshot of current discourse involving sexual assault in the military for 
each. Following the comparative analysis in the next section, this study concludes with some 
reflections on the forthcoming report of the Independent Review Commission. 
 





The military justice system in Australia is centered on the Defence Force Discipline 
Act of 1982, the present compilation of which (No. 33) is current as of March 2, 2019.10 
While the Australian MJ system does permit military commanders to refer certain cases to 
court-martial, commanders may not do so in the case of a “prescribed offence.” These 
include some specified offenses such as treason, murder, and manslaughter,11 while the 
Defense Force Discipline Regulations further define prescribed offences as a service offence 
that is punishable by imprisonment for more than two years.12 
For any prescribed offence, a commander or military law enforcement agency may 
refer a file to the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), and the DMP determines 
whether to initiate a court-martial. Likewise, if an agency of the Joint Military Police Unit 
(JMPU) determines that a case involving prescribed offences should not go forward, the 
JMPU agrees to refer the file to the Office of the DMP (ODMP) “for consideration as to 
the appropriate course of action to be taken.”13 According to § 63 of the DFDA, the 
(civilian) Director of Public Prosecutions must provide consent before the ODMP may 
 
10 See Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/c2019c00107. 
11 Defence Force Discipline Regulations 2018 (Cth) § 104  https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/f2018l00265 
12 Id., § 51 (this section of the DFDA includes a few exceptions to the definition of prescribed offenses that are not 
relevant to the present discussion). 
13 Director of Military Prosecutions, Report for the Period 01 January to 31 December 2019 (3 April 2020), para 37, 
https://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/docs/2019-dmp-annual-report.pdf. 
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initiate a prosecution for “certain serious offences, such as murder and aggravated sexual 
assault offences.”14 
Although the ODMP commenced operations in July 2003,15 the Defence Legislation 
Amendment Act of 2006 consolidated the previous system of convening authorities and 
conferred the role of primary convening authority to the DMP.16 Because the ODMP refers 
prescribed offences to court-martial, then, military commanders do not have charging 
authority in relation to allegations of serious sexual misconduct. Since data involving the 
annual number of allegations of sexual misconduct is not available from before 2006 when 
the ODMP assumed primary consolidated convening authority for prescribed offences, a 
simple comparison of pre-reform and post-reform statistics is not possible. However, a 
statistical analysis of several key data points is useful in the endeavor to assess whether 
moving primary charging authority from commanders to the DMP enhanced the 
performance of the Australian military justice system in relation to the categories of 
outcomes reformists in the United States hope to improve by following suit. 
The first point of interest is to note that there is no statistical correlation between the 
reform and the numbers of reports of “unacceptable behavior” that were submitted during 
the relevant time period. This metric, unacceptable behavior, which includes sexual offenses 
among other similar categories of misconduct, is the only quantifiable data set that spans the 
pre-reform and post-reform period. Starting with the period of 2001-2002 and continuing 
through the period of 2010-11, the total number of reports of unacceptable behavior per 
year are: 331, 451, 586, 749, 685, 846, 765, 873, 719, and 720 (these figures are drawn from 
three consolidated reports, the Defence Annual Reports of 2004-05,17 2008-09,18 and 2010-
1119). The fifth entry in this data set of ten annual figures, 685, corresponds with the year 
DMP assumed primary consolidated convening authority for the Australian Defence Force.  
 
14 Id. para. 54. 
15 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2004-05 (4 November 2005), 125, 
https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/04-05/downloads/0405_dar_10_full.pdf. 
16 See Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), https://www.legislation.gov.au/details/c2006a00159. 
17 Department of Defence, supra note 15 at 121. 
18 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2008-09, Vol. 1, cover 2 (Table, Key Defence Statistics), 
https://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/08-09/2008-2009_Defence_DAR_01_v1prelim. 
19 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2010-11, Vol. 1 at 265 (Figure A5.3), 
https://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/10-11/dar_1011_v1_full.pdf. 
7 
If a measure of performance for the military justice system is that the number of 
reports of unacceptable behavior will decline, these statistics indicate that there is not a 
correlation between the reform and this measure of performance. Although “unacceptable 
behavior” in this context is not limited only to sexual offenses, the perceived performance of 
the ADF involving certain “aspects of military and organisational culture,” including “in 
relation to sexual and other abuse,” prompted a series of comprehensive reviews beginning 
in 201120 (the end of the above data set). If satisfactory progress had been made from 2006 
to 2011, it would be reasonable to assume that “sexual and other abuse” would not have 
been an “aspect of military and organisational culture” that needed to be reviewed. 
A second point of interest related to ADF statistical reports is that the number of 
reports of sexual assault incidents has not appreciably declined in the period ranging from 
2012-13 to 2019-20. While this range does not date back to 2006 when DMP took over 
primary convening authority for courts-martial, it is again reasonable to assume that pre-
2012 statistical measurements were deemed to be unacceptable at least as late as 2011 when 
the wave of comprehensive reviews related to military and organizational culture was 
directed. The benefit of the data set reflected in the table below, which is drawn from the 
2019-20 installment of the Annual Defence report,21 is that the statistics present the 
numbers of reported sexual assaults per reporting period rather than reports of 
“unacceptable behavior” more generally.  
Although the figures from 2016-17 and before cannot be compared directly with the 
figures from 2017-18 and later since “different reporting frameworks” were adopted starting 
in 2017, this data set presents no indication that the number of reported sexual assault 





20 See Department of Defence, Annual Report 2010-11, Part 1 at 4, https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/11-
12/dar_1112_full.pdf. 
21 Department of Defence, Annual Report 2019-20 (21 September 2020), 143, 
https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/19-20/dar_2019-20_complete.pdf. 
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A third point of interest that emerges from examining the various reports that are 
available to the public and that involve metrics of sexual assault in the ADF is that the 
number of new incident management advice clients that are reported by the Sexual 
Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (SeMPRO) has increased steadily since the 
Office began operations in July 2013. The table below, which is drawn from the most recent 
annual SeMPRO report, reveals that the average number of new incident management 
advice clients referred to SeMPRO in the office’s first three years of operation was 116, 
while the average number in the three most recent years is 251.30.22 This represents a more 
than twofold increase in the average number of new incident management advice clients that 
were referred to the Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office in the most recent 







The final point of interest involving reports of sexual assault in the ADF to be 
addressed here involves the prevalence of complainants in sexual offense allegations who 
make the informed decision not to participate in investigative or prosecutorial efforts. In the 
most recent report published by the Director of Military Prosecutions, the DMP explains in 
detail the process and purpose of the dialogue in which the prosecution engages with the 
complainant in a sexual assault allegation:23 
 
Complainants in sexual offence allegations are advised of all their options, the 
legislative protections provided for them, including giving evidence remotely, 
restriction on cross examination and suppression of complainant’s identity and the fact 
 
22 Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office Annual Report FY 2019–20, 16, 
https://www.defence.gov.au/sempro/_master/docs/sempro-annual-report-fy2019-20.pdf. 
23 Director of Military Prosecutions, supra note 13, para. 42. 
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that they can reverse their decision not to proceed with an allegation at a later date and 
the implications that may bring. The intention is to ensure that a complainant’s 
decision not to proceed any further with a complaint is not based on erroneous 
assumptions or misunderstanding about the prosecution process. 
 
Notwithstanding this detailed dialogue that is designed to ensure that complainants make an 
informed decision whether to participate in the prosecutorial process, this most recent DMP 
report indicates, “As in the previous reporting period, the overwhelming majority of [cases 
referred to ODMP] were prescribed sexual offences,” and “in the majority of cases, the 
complainant made the informed decision to take no further action once the complaint was 
made, or there was insufficient credible evidence to proceed with the matter.”24 With the 
above data related to the issue of sexual assault in the military in focus, what lessons can be 
drawn regarding the intended outcomes if the suggestion to remove prosecution decisions 
from military commanders were to be implemented in the United States?  
If the overall number of reports of sexual offenses is any indication of the effectiveness 
of the reform, the above analysis presents no correlative relationship to suggest that 
implementing the reform would reduce the number of allegations of sexual assault made 
each year. The connection between the sharp and steady rise of new incident advice clients 
referred to SeMPRO each year and the observation by the DMP that a complainant makes 
an informed decision not to proceed with the prosecution process is a factor “in the majority 
of cases” indicates that there is no correlation to support the assertion that conferring court-
martial convening authority outside the chain of command “will mean more survivors come 
forward” if the suggested reform were implemented in the United States. The other factor 
that contributes to the DMP observation that an allegation does not progress “in the 
majority of cases” – that “there was insufficient credible evidence to proceed with the 
matter” – indicates that conferring convening authority to a prosecutor rather than a 
commander will not mean “different cases are chosen and there's a better end result.”  
 
24 Id, para. 38. 
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In short, an analysis of the performance of the ADF military justice system presents no 
correlative relationship to support the assertion that the suggested reform will “fix” the 
problem of sexual assault in the military if the United States were to follow Australia’s lead. 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom established an independent military prosecution service in 
2006. For the UK, the revision was primarily in response to a string of successful challenges 
filed with and adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights. In the first such case, 
Findlay v. United Kingdom (1997), the ECtHR found that the degree of authority exercised 
by the accused’s commander violated the accused’s/complainant’s right to an independent 
trial pursuant to Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.25 After several 
similar decisions by the ECtHR (such as Coyne (1997),26 Morris (2002),27 and Grieves (2003)28), 
the UK finally established the independent Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) with the 
adoption of the Armed Forces Act of 2006.29 
In the UK, the SPA “is the principal prosecuting authority within the Service Justice 
System and is responsible for the prosecution of service offences before the Service 
Courts.”30 The primary functions of the SPA are to decide “whether the case should be 
prosecuted,” decide “where the case should be prosecuted,” determine “the appropriate 
charges to bring,” and to prepare and present cases “in the Service courts – using either 
employed advocates or members of the Bar.”31 As the SPA main website notes, the office “is 
 
25 See Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22107/93 (Feb. 25, 1997), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58016%22]}. 
26 See Coyne v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25942/94 (Sep. 24, 1977), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58097%22]}. 
27 See Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38784/97 (Feb. 26, 2002), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22morris%20v.%20uk%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%
22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-60170%22]}. 
28 See Grieves v. United Kingdom, App. No. 57067/00 (Dec. 16, 2003), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-61550%22]}. 
29 See Armed Forces Act 2006, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/52/part/18/crossheading/service-
prosecuting-authority. 
30 Ministry of Defence, Guidance: Service Prosecuting Authority, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/service-prosecuting-
authority (Feb. 24, 2021). 
31 Id. 
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independent of both the Ministry of Defence and the military chain of command in respect 
of its prosecutorial functions,” and it “acts under the general superintendence of the 
Attorney General.”32 
Although the breadth and depth of statistical reporting for the UK does not quite 
match the Australian example, the nature of reporting adequately supports the endeavor of 
the UK government to measure the performance of the military justice system. While the 
most extensive and consistent statistical reporting dates back only to 2015, a number of 
trends that are relevant to the present inquiry emerge from an assessment of a few key 
metrics. The table below collects several data points from the 201733 and 202034 editions of 
the annual report known as the Sexual Offences in the Service Justice System.  
Since each annual report presents data from the current and preceding two years, an 
analysis of these two reports permits coverage from 2015 to 2020. For the present inquiry, 
the following data points related to allegations of sexual offenses are drawn from these two 
reports: number of military personnel suspected of committing sexual offenses (Table 2 of 
the reports), number of cases referred to the SPA for possible prosecution (Table 5 of the 
reports), number of offenses with defendants heard at courts-martial (Table 6), and number 
of guilty verdicts for these courts-martial (also Table 6). From 2015 to 2020, the numbers for 
each data point in the set, as well as the percent of cases referred to the SPA that were heard 









33 Ministry of Defence, Sexual Offences in The Service Justice System: 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sexual-offences-in-the-service-justice-system-2017 (MS Excel 
Spreadsheet) (Mar. 20, 2019). 
34 Minisry of Defence, Sexual Offences in The Service Justice System: 2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sexual-offences-in-the-service-justice-system-2020 (MS Excel 
Spreadsheet) (Mar. 25, 2021). 
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 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total 
Military suspects 88 116 138 160 188 150 840 
Cases referred to SPA 99 130 86 123 157 152 747 
Offenses with defendants 
heard at court-martial 
51 47 70 55 58 50 331 
Guilty verdicts 21 21 26 21 16 29 134 
Percent of referrals heard 
at court-martial  
51.5 36.2 81.4 44.7 36.9 32.9 44.3 
Percent of convictions 
from courts-martial 
41.1 44.7 37.1 38.1 27.6 58.0 40.5 
 
If these figures are compared to similar data drawn from reports published by the 
U.S. military, an analytical comparison of the number of cases referred to court-martial and 
the number of convictions at trial can be performed. Since military commanders rather than 
an independent prosecutor refer cases to trial in the U.S. system, the number of alleged 
sexual offenses for which the evidence supports a potential commander’s action (rather than 
the SPA) takes the place of the second row above. Also, because statistics are compiled by 
the U.S. military by fiscal year, which ends on September 30, the FY20 report is not yet 
available.  
The data in the top row in the table below is drawn from the U.S. 2019 Annual 
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military (commonly referred to as a SAPRO Report) by 
extrapolating the percentage of sexual offenses for which a service member is a suspect from 
the total number of reported offenses for each year.35 The remaining figures are drawn from 
a statistical study that collects the relevant data from the corresponding SAPRO Reports for 
each year.36 The following table, then, presents for the U.S. military the data that is 
equivalent to entries related to the UK military justice system reflected in the table above.  
 
35 Dep’t Def., Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2019 (Apr. 17, 2020), Appendix B at 11 
(Figure 4), https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/3_appendix_b_statistical_data_on_sexual_assault.pdf. 
36 David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, National, Military, and College Reports on Prosecution of Sexual 




 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total 
Military suspects 3,621 3,489 3,884 4,470 4,616 -- 20,080 
Evidence supports 
commander’s action 
1,437 1,331 1,466 1,211 1,629 -- 7,074 
Cases tried at court-martial 543 389 406 307 363 -- 2,008 
Convictions 413 261 284 203 264 -- 1,425 
Percent supportable 
offenses tried at court-
martial  
37.8 29.2 27.7 25.4 22.2 -- 28.4 
Percent of convictions 
from courts-martial 
76.1 67.1 70.1 66.1 72.7 -- 70.1 
 
In total, the rate of cases tried at court-martial is 64.1% higher in the UK as 
compared to the U.S., but the conviction rate for the cases that are tried by court-martial is 
57.8% higher in the U.S. over this period as compared to the UK. Incidentally, the 
percentage of cases initiated by military commanders in the US over this period is 55.9%, 
which is slightly higher than the 44.3% of referrals to the SPA in the UK that are heard at 
court-martial. The higher rate of initiation (55.9%) compared with the lower rate of cases 
ultimately tried at court-martial in the U.S. (28.4%) indicates that a significant number of 
cases (1,946 over five years) are determined by commanders not to be appropriate for court-
martial during the pre-trial process or are resolved prior to trial. For both jurisdictions, the 
number of reports for which a service member is the subject has gradually increased over 
this period of time.  
While the rate of cases heard at court-martial is notably lower for the U.S. military, 
the conviction rate for those cases that do go to trial is substantially higher in the U.S. system. 
Likewise, the rate of cases for sexual offenses are initiated by U.S. commanders is noticeably 
higher than the rate of cases ultimately sent to court-martial by the SPA in the UK. If the 
figures from the UK present a useful comparison, the statistical analysis of similar U.S. and 
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UK numbers indicates that the U.S. is already performing in a similar or even preferrable 
manner as compared to a military justice system that has conferred court-martial convening 




The military justice system for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is similar to the UK in 
that a military prosecutor is conferred with the sole authority to refer a case to court-martial 
(to “draw up and file informations” in the vernacular of the Military Justice Law).37 When 
current law professor and former IDF judge advocate Amos N. Guiora gave testimony to 
the U.S. Senate in 2013, he observed that the “the Israeli system is profoundly different from 
the current American system” primarily because of the “‘balance of power’ between the 
commander and the Judge Advocate.”38 As a judge advocate, Guiora noted, he “was solely 
entrusted with the decision to order the filing of an indictment against a soldier or officer” 
and “the commander was granted no authority in the matter.”39 
Although primary sources containing metrics such as those examined above for other 
jurisdictions are not as widely available to the public (as far as I can tell), some relevant and 
useful data is available from secondary sources. Regarding the overall number of sexual 
assault complaints filed by military members, a report released last year observed that “in the 
last decade there has been an average annual increase of 11 percent in reports.”40 According 
to the same report, the number of complaints filed last year alone constitutes an “exceptional 
increase in scope” compared to the previous year since the increase in 2020 was 24% 
compared to 2019 – which is of course far higher than the average annual increase of 11%.41 
 
37 § 181(b), Military Justice Law, 5715—1955, SH 189 171, as amended, 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns2_militaryjustice_1_eng.pdf. 
38 Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 
130th Cong. 219 (2013) (statement of Amos N. Guiora), https://www.congress.gov/113/chrg/CHRG-
113shrg88639/CHRG-113shrg88639.pdf#page=223 [hereinafter Statement of Amos N. Guiora]. 
39 Id. 





A similar report published in 2019 found that 1,706 complaints involving sexual offenses 
were received from military members, while “just 165 cases were investigated by the relevant 
military authorities.”42  
This represents an investigation rate of 9.7%. The seemingly low rate of investigation is 
consistent with a description of the findings of a similar report from 2018. According to the 
description of these official findings, while “soldiers are more comfortable reporting sexual 
assault, the report found there has been almost no increases in investigations by military 
police into sexual assaults reported by soldiers and even a drop in cases opened by the 
Military Advocate General’s Office.”43 
Based on the overall number of complaints related to sexual offenses that are filed by 
military members, then, the current trend in Israel is the same as in Australia and the UK: a 
steady annual increase during the past several years. Notwithstanding this steady increase in 
the number of complaints filed, the number of investigations initiated and cases prosecuted 
appears to be trending in the opposite direction. This is the case even though, to return to 
Guiroa’s reflection in 2013, “the Israeli system is profoundly different from the current 
American system” in that judge advocates are “solely entrusted with the decision to order 




For the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the authority to send a criminal charge to 
court-martial (that is, “prefer” charges in CAF vernacular) is vested solely with the Canadian 
Military Prosecution Service (CMPS),45 for which the Director of Military Prosecutions 
(DMP) is the head. The recommendation to establish this separate prosecution service was a 
 
42 9 Out of 10 Rape Cases in Israel Closed Without Charges — Study, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/9-out-of-10-rape-cases-in-israel-closed-without-charges-study. 
43 Anna Ahronheim, Dramatic Rise in Number of IDF Soldiers Reporting Sexual Assault, THE JERUSALEM POST 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/dramatic-rise-in-number-of-idf-soldiers-reporting-sexual-
assault-572369. 
44 Statement of Amos N. Guiora, supra note 38 at 219. 




central aspect of the 1997 Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice.46 The 
CMPS as well as the position of DMP have been operational since September 1999.  
In 2015, an external review of the Canadian military justice system observed that 
“very little data is collected by the CAF with respect to the occurrence of either sexual 
harassment or sexual assault.”47 This review, which is widely referred to as the Deschamps 
Report (after the external review authority, Marie Deschamps), further determined that “the 
failure to keep data on complaints of sexual assault significantly weakens the accountability 
of the chain of command.”48 Largely as a result of these findings, starting in 2016 there are 
now more extensive and comprehensive statistical data available for study. 
The first data point to be considered here appears at first glance to be encouraging if 
a desired outcome is a reduction in the number of reported sexual assaults. During the three-
year period from FY 2016-17 to FY 2018-19, the number of sexual assault incidents reported 
to the chain of command fell from 461 to 413 to 302.49 This constitutes a steady and rather 
impressive decline of 65.5% over a three-year period. 
However, when these figures are considered in light of statistics involving responses 
to a biennial survey, the performance of the CAF related to the desired outcomes if the 
United States were to divest commanders of court-martial referral authority appears rather 
less encouraging. In the first such survey, which was administered externally by Statistics 
Canada in 2016, a total of 960 CAF Regular Force members indicated that they had 
experienced sexual assault during the 12 months before completing the survey.50 In the 
second survey, which was administered by Stats Canada in 2018, that same figure fell a 
meager 7%, to 900 total.51  
 
46 See Director of Military Prosecutions, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-
defence/services/benefits-military/legal-services/mil-prosecutions.html (last visited May 23, 2021). 
47 Marie Deschamps, External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed 
Forces at vi (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-
mdn/migration/assets/forces_internet/docs/en/caf-community-support-services-harassment/era-final-report-april-20-
2015-eng.pdf. 
48 Id. at 72. 
49 2019 Sexual Misconduct Incident Tracking Report 4 (August 2019), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-
mdn/documents/reports/2019/2019-sexual-misconduct-report-en.pdf. 
50 Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces, 2016, STATISTICS CANADA 11 (28 November 2016), 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-603-x/85-603-x2016001-eng.pdf?st=ZOh5OnSw. 
51 Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces, 2018, STATISTICS CANADA 11 (22 May 2018), 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-603-x/85-603-x2019002-eng.pdf?st=fXoKV9aD. 
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In the first iteration of the Statistics Canada survey, the number of reports of sexual 
assault received by the chain of command is 48.0% lower than the number of respondents 
who indicated that they experienced sexual assault over a comparable period (461 reports to 
the command compared to 960 affirmative survey responses). By the time of the second 
survey, that percentage fell to 33.6% (302 reports to 900 affirmative survey responses). 
These data points reveal that five years ago almost half of the Regular Force members who 
indicated that they had been the victim of sexual assault declined to make a report, while 
three years ago the rate of reporting fell from about half to only one third.  
According to Senator Gillibrand’s performance criteria, this already low reporting rate 
and the subsequent sharp decline would indicate a lack of trust in the reporting and 
adjudication process in the CAF. This condition exists notwithstanding that statutory court-
martial preferral authority (“referral” in U.S. military vernacular) has been vested solely in the 
Director of Military Prosecutions since 1998.52 When the rate at which allegations of sexual 
assault that do get reported to the chain of command are preferred to court-martial (again, a 
“preferral” in CAF terminology is a “referral” in U.S. vernacular), the apparent performance 
in relation to the desired outcomes if the United States were to implement the suggested 
reform is similarly unpromising.  
In the three-year period from 2016-1753 to 2018-19,54 the number of sexual assault 
offenses prosecuted at court-martial was 9, 9, and 6, respectively. As described above, the 
number of reports of sexual assault of which the chain of command was notified during 
these years was 461, 413, and 302. The rate of court-martial preferral for sexual assault 
offenses as a function of the number of reports received by the chain of command each year 
over this three-year period, then, is 2.0%, 2.2%, and 2.0%, respectively. By way of 
comparison, the ratio of reports to court-martial referrals for the U.S. military during this 
 
52 National Defence Act, S.C. 1998, C 25 § 165, https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/36-1/bill/C-25/royal-
assent/page-77#19. 
53 Minister of National Defence, 2017-2018 Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General, Annex C, 
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/legal-juridique/reports-
rapports/jag/jag_AnnualReport_2017-18.pdf#page=56. 




period was 3,489:389; 3,884:406; and 4,470:307 (as described in the table above when 
comparing the quantitative performance of the UK and the U.S.). These ratios equate to 
11.1%, 10.5%, and 6.9%, respectively.   
The three-year average of the ratio of the number of sexual assault notifications 
provided to the chain of command to the number of sexual assault preferrals/referrals 
during this period is 2.1% for the CAF and 9.5% for the U.S. military. This means the 
average for the U.S. military, where commanders make the decision to refer charges to 
court-martial, was more than 4.5 times higher than the average for the CAF during this 
period. If a goal of the suggested reform is to increase the number of sexual assault 
allegations that get referred to trial in the U.S. military, this comparison with the Canadian 
Armed Forces – where the separate Directorate of Military Prosecutions makes all preferral 
decisions – suggests that the U.S. military is already performing significantly better than the 
CAF in relation to this particular measure of performance. 
 
The Comparative Quantitative Analysis and the Independent Review Commission 
Recommendations 
 
The comparative quantitative analysis conducted in the present study does not bode 
well for reformists such as Senator Kirsten Gillibrand who adamantly proclaim that 
removing court-martial charging decisions from commanders will improve the issue of 
sexual assault in the United States military. The military justice systems of several U.S. 
partners or allies have long ago partially or completely removed charging authority from 
commanders in favor of lawyers. Just like the United States, these partners and allies – 
including Australia,55 the UK,56 Israel,57 and Canada58 – are still in search of effective 
 
55 Cam Wilson, Australia's Defence Forces Have Spent $50 Million on Sexual Abuse Claims in the Past Three 
Years, BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/australias-defence-
forces-50-million-dollars-sexual-abuse-claims-in-three-years-2020-10. 
56 Nigel Nelson, Call for Ban on Armed Forces Trying Rape Cases after Being 'Repeatedly Bungled', MIRROR (Feb. 
14, 2021), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/call-ban-armed-forces-trying-23499385. 
57 Zero Tolerance, supra note 40. 
58 Jacques Gallant, ‘Are They Going to Follow Up This Time?’: Ottawa Announces Another External Review of 
Sexual Misconduct in the Military, THE STAR (Apr. 29, 2021), 
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solutions. The absence of a correlative relationship between the “reform” and the desired 
outcomes in relation to the problem of sexual assault in the military for partners and allies 
indicates that implementing the change in the United States will not achieve the intended 
effects.  
That is, if the experience of partners and allies is a useful gauge, there is no 
quantifiable connection between removing charging authority from commanders and 
improved systemic performance in relation to outcomes that have been identified by 
reformists as indications of improvement in relation to sexual assault in the military. Of 
course, just like any quantitative analysis of an inherently qualitative outcome such as 
“improved” performance regarding sexual assault in the military, the efficiency of the 
statistical evaluation conducted herein is limited to a certain degree. The endeavor of 
drawing useful subjective appraisals from aggregated statistical data tends to obscure much 
of the nuance that can best inform value judgements regarding systemic performance.  
This obfuscation is even more prevalent when engaging in a comparative quantitative 
analysis since measuring across systems is not particularly responsive to latent divergences in 
history and culture that could contribute to differences in performance in the areas that are 
measured. Inherent limitations notwithstanding, citing to quantitative data has become a 
mainstay in the campaign to remove charging authority from military commanders. So, too, 
has the tactic of asserting that the United States should follow the lead of partners and allies 
that have already made the switch. If the case for “reform” is to continue to rest primarily on 
inherently limited quantitative and comparative claims of improved performance, a 
comparative quantitative analysis such as that conducted in this study can help inform the 
judgments of lawmakers in the coming months as well as the perspectives of the constituents 
they represent.  
For now, all eyes will be on the report of the Independent Review Commission when 
it is made public – and particularly on the “accountability” line of effort portion of the 





military”59 and the accountability line of effort reportedly presented to Secretary Austin an 
initial recommendation “that would take the responsibility of prosecuting sexual assault 
offenses out of commanders' hands” after only six weeks,60 it is reasonable to question 
whether the Commission conducted a comprehensive and impartial evaluation of the 
available data before offering this recommendation. In the interests of full disclosure and 
transparency, surely the IRC will publish a comprehensive accounting of all the evidence that 
was presented to the Commission and that the Commission members considered when 
forming the recommendations that will be presented in the final report.  
As part of this accounting, it is of course reasonable to expect that the 
recommendations from the accountability line of effort will present convincing evidence that 
the suggested “reform” will bring about improved systemic performance in the U.S. military. 
No doubt this convincing evidence will explain why the United States military can expect 
improved performance in relation to the issue of sexual assault in the military 
notwithstanding that a comparative quantitative analysis indicates that there is no correlative 
relationship between removing charging authority from military commanders and the 
improved outcomes reformists seek to foster. In the absence of a comprehensive accounting 
of all evidence considered and of convincing proof demonstrating that the result will be 
different in the U.S. military than the experiences of partners and allies that have made the 
switch, lawmakers and their constituents will need to consider the IRC recommendations 
with a considerable degree of skepticism. 
 
59 Lopez, supra note 7. 
60 Jim Garamone, Leaders Discuss Initial Sex Assault Review Commission Recommendation, DOD NEWS (May 7, 
2021), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2600363/leaders-discuss-initial-sex-assault-review-
commission-recommendation. 
